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A B S T R A C T   
Context: ‘What does ‘The Public’ think?’ is a question often posed by researchers and policy makers, and public 
values are regularly invoked to justify policy decisions. Over time there has been a participatory turn in the social 
and health sciences, including health technology assessment and priority setting in health, towards citizen 
participation such that public policies reflect public values. It is one thing to agree that public values are 
important, however, and another to agree on how public values should be elicited, deliberated upon and inte-
grated into decision-making. Surveys of public values rarely deliver unanimity, and preference heterogeneity, or 
plurality, is to be expected. 
Methods: This paper examines the role of public values in health policy and how to elicit, analyse, and present 
values, in the face of plurality. We delineate the strengths and weaknesses of aggregative and deliberative 
methods before setting out a new empirical framework, drawing on Sunstein’s Incompletely Theorised Agree-
ments, based on three levels: principles, policies and patients. The framework is illustrated using a recognised 
policy dilemma – the provision of high cost, limited-effect medicines intended to extend life for people with 
terminal illnesses. 
Findings: Application of the multi-level framework to public values permits transparent consideration of plurality, 
including analysis of coherence and consensus, in a way that offers routes to policy recommendations that are 
based on public values and justified in those terms. 
Conclusions: Using the new framework and eliciting quantitative and qualitative data across levels of abstraction 
has the potential to inform policy recommendations grounded in public values, where values are plural. This is 
not to suggest that one solution will magically emerge, but rather that choices between policies can be explicitly 
justified in relation to the properties of public values, and a much clearer understanding of (in)consistencies and 
areas of consensus.   
1. Introduction 
‘What does ‘The Public’ think?’ is a question often posed by re-
searchers, policy makers, politicians and journalists. Public values are 
invoked, often without evidence, to justify policy decisions. Over time 
there has been a participatory turn in the social and health sciences, and 
in public sector decision-making, with requirements for public 
involvement written into the institutions and structures of health sys-
tems (NHS England, 2019; NHS England/Public Particiption Team, 
2017; Canadian Institutes of Health Research, 2020). Public and patient 
involvement (PPI) and engagement (PPIE) is now a formal requirement 
of many health research funding bodies such as the National Institute for 
Health Research (NIHR) in the UK (NIHR, 2014). This is, arguably, a 
good thing. Involving the public in decisions about public resources is 
democratic – as citizens we should be able to participate in decisions that 
affect us. More instrumentally, we might argue that decisions that take 
account of public values and preferences are more intelligent and will 
lead to better outcomes in terms of social welfare. This is a standard 
assumption of cost benefit and social welfare analyses in economics, but 
the instrumental value of public involvement in decisions about public 
resources is an assertion also made more widely (Stevenson, 2016). 
Health priority setting is the process by which options are evaluated 
and resources allocated, determining who gets what (Mitton and 
Donaldson, 2004; Weale et al., 2016). Explicit forms of health priority 
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setting usually centre on appraisal of the costs and benefits of different 
courses of action. But, priority setting in health is a complex, 
multi-criteria decision process and, despite recent advances, (health) 
economic evaluation has, in the past and also recently, struggled to 
account for broader considerations in relation to equity and fair distri-
bution of resources (Mitton et al., 2019; Hadorn, 1991; Cookson et al., 
2017; NICE, 2009). Even when faced with the same economic evidence, 
reasonable people might disagree about how best to allocate resources 
(Daniels, 2000). In such situations, where collective resources and 
distributional justice are at stake, public values are increasingly 
included as one part of health priority setting practices and frameworks 
(Mitton et al., 2011; Abelson et al., 2013; Baltussen et al., 2017). 
It is one thing to agree that public values are important, however, and 
another to agree on how public values should be elicited, deliberated 
upon and integrated into decision-making. In this paper we focus on the 
first two of these issues, elicitation and deliberation, and raise some 
consequent issues for decision making in the discussion section. Typically, 
health economists elicit values and preferences through surveys of 
representative population samples (Shah et al., 2015; Pinto-Prades et al., 
2014; Pennington et al., 2015; Rowen et al., 2016; Lancsar et al., 2011); 
bioethicists place emphasis on the quality and coherence of arguments 
(Norheim, 2016; Fourie et al., 2012; Biron et al., 2012) and might ques-
tion the relevance of participation by (ill-informed) publics; political 
scientists and advocates of public deliberation have designed processes to 
surface public values in a way that can inform policy (Abelson et al., 2013; 
Escobar, 2017; Fleck et al., 2012). But in all such surveys and processes 
disagreements, preference heterogeneity or plurality, are to be expected 
(Daniels et al., 2012). 
Plurality presents challenges for policy development that seeks to 
take account of public values. How can one policy take account of 
multiple, competing perspectives? Different disciplines take different 
approaches to account for plurality in public values in a way that might 
lead to policy recommendations, placing different emphasis on counting 
(majoritarianism, strength of preference), coherence (logical consistency 
and moral argument) and finding consensus (deliberative, talk-centred 
methods). But generally there are two routes researchers employ to 
address plurality; aggregation or deliberation (Gutmann and Thompson, 
2004). 
In this paper, we unpack the approaches to public values in priority 
setting before bringing together the strengths of aggregation and 
deliberation in an interdisciplinary framework, influenced by Sunstein’s 
Incompletely Theorized Agreeements (Sunstein, 1995, 1998). This 
multi-level framework delineates high-level values from mid-level pol-
icies, norms or rules, and further, from the particulars of cases or specific 
decisions. At essence this renders visible the nature of plurality in public 
values and permits transparent consideration of coherence and 
consensus, in a way that provides options for policy recommendations. 
Finally, placing the framework into a real policy context - the provision 
of expensive medicines of limited effectiveness for people with terminal 
illnesses - we provide examples of methods through which the frame-
work might be used to structure empirical research into public values. 
2. Defining terms: public(s), value(s) and priority setting 
Before setting out the framework, some key terms – ‘public’, ‘public 
values’ and ‘priority setting’ – warrant brief explanation. 
2.1. Public(s) 
There are many potential publics that can be constructed for policy 
making (Escobar, 2017; Stewart, 2016). We use the term here to point to 
the role of citizens and distinguish from the values we might elicit from 
patients or users of health services. Patient and public involvement (PPI) 
and engagement (PPIE) are catch-all terms commonly used in health 
research. ‘The Public’ is clearly the larger group of which patients are a 
subset, but there is emerging consensus in the academic literature that 
patient and public, rather than describing categories of people, should be 
seen as roles that people (are asked to) occupy, roles with particular 
expectations and claims. 
Fredricksson and Tritter (2017) helpfully disentangle the Ps in PPI, 
drawing up ideal types for patients and publics (Fredriksson and Tritter, 
2017). Patients are health services users with experiential knowledge 
and a sectional (rather than societal) interest in the health and wellbeing 
of a particular interest group. The role of citizens is to focus on the 
wellbeing of the general public, to adopt collective perspectives and to 
represent societal rather than sectional interests. As disinterested 
members of the public, citizens are expected to take a more detached 
role (Lehoux et al., 2012) that does not entail particular knowledge, 
personal interest or advocacy, but reasonable judgments about the value 
placed on different states of the world (with respect to the distribution of 
health resources) from behind a Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’. 
There are a number of important discussions about seeking ‘ordinary 
citizens’ for public engagement roles (Martin, 2008), the so-called lay 
paradox (Ives et al., 2013) and the “ontological lightness” of citizens in 
this context (Lehoux et al., 2012). These are beyond the scope of this 
paper and here we make use of a minimal definition of public in terms of 
the role of citizens and the societal perspective that implies. 
2.2. Public Value(s) 
For purposes of this discussion, we allow ‘public values’ to remain 
quite a broad term, which reflects its use in health priority setting 
literature and policy documents (in which publications we see reference 
to social or societal as well as public values). Following Clark and Weale, 
we distinguish public values from pure moral values in that public (or 
social) values are based on the values of a particular society at a 
particular time (Clark and Weale, 2012). 
The term values has at least two distinct connotations: i) value, used 
in the economics sense to mean measurable strength of preference for a 
good or service, expressed through trade-offs or sacrifice; and ii) values 
as higher level principles, moral or socio-cultural standards that people 
hold as good or right. In this sense values are normative commitments 
that might motivate or justify different courses of action. For example, 
the choice ‘I would prefer hypothetical patient A to benefit from scarce 
resources over patient B’ is a judgement implying more value (in the 
economics sense) is placed on treatment of patient A; it is not a moral 
principle. A health maximising reason for that choice (because overall 
health gain is greater if we invest in treatment A) reflects a commitment 
to the principle that we ought to make decisions that maximise health. 
Both i) and ii) are important components of the framework ultimately 
proposed. 
It is worth noting that ‘values’ and ‘principles’ are terms often used 
quite interchangeably in the priority setting literature and beyond. 
There are semantic distinctions and different definitions not only in 
ethics and economics as highlighted here, but also sociology, psychology 
and in the ways in which policy communities might use the term ‘values’ 
(Datta Burton et al., 2021; Jain et al., 2019). NICE produced a ‘Social 
Value Judgements’ document in 2008 (NICE, 2008). Although the 
document title uses the terms value and judgements, it refers throughout 
to principles. Values might be seen as more fundamental, or founda-
tional, than principles, but the level of abstraction is not always clear. 
For example in their work on social values in health priority setting 
Clark and Weale (2012) include fundamental values such as solidarity 
and autonomy alongside cost effectiveness (which they note is perhaps a 
balancing of other values). 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to resolve discussions about what 
constitutes values versus principles, but fortunately the framework we 
propose below does not insist on a particular reading of such terms; only 
that these are both of a higher order than choices or judgements. Both 
imply claims about what is right, fair, or what things should matter. 
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2.3. Priority setting and resource allocation 
‘Priority setting’ is a term used commonly in health economics and 
health technology assessment (HTA). It has largely replaced the word 
‘rationing’ and its connotations of wartime shortages of basic goods, 
although they mean broadly the same thing. Priority setting implies 
decisions in relation to who gets what (e.g. services and technologies), as 
a consequence of which there will be winners and losers. In the context 
of a fixed budget and an existing allocation of resources, if all opera-
tional efficiency gains have already been exploited, a decision to invest 
in X means disinvesting in Y. Much attention is given to HTA and de-
cisions about the adoption of new technologies in the literature on pri-
ority setting in health (Bryan et al., 2014). However, priority setting is 
wider than HTA (Mitton et al., 2019) and there is a range of potential 
settings in which priority setting takes place, as described by Weale et al. 
(2016): 
… Priority setting in health care does not simply take place in the 
setting of HTA agencies, however. Cabinets, government de-
partments, health care agencies and local authorities all have a role 
in priority setting through their routine decisions on resource and 
budgetary allocations, decisions on capital spending, price negotia-
tions with manufacturers on pharmaceutical products and medical 
devices as well as investments in the training of medical and para- 
medical staff. Courts play a role in adjudicating the extent to 
which some of these decisions, when contested by plaintiffs, conform 
to administrative, constitutional or international law. Hospitals and 
insurance agencies make decisions on which services to provide and 
to whom. And individual physicians are inevitably involved in 
making decisions on health priorities when they make treatment 
decisions with their patients. From boardroom to bedside the 
determination of priorities is implicit in an organized health care 
system. (Weale et al., 2016) p 737. 
In this paper, we are concerned with how we can evidence and 
analyse plurality in public values to better inform priority setting in 
relation to policies dictating the provision of care and services (noting 
more broadly that public values can be put to other uses, such as to 
inform marketing or political campaigns). We distinguish this from 
clinical decisions about treatment of individual patients and from indi-
vidual treatment requests or judicial appeals which we see as exceptions 
and challenges to public policy (although clearly these individual de-
cisions influence resource allocation). 
2.4. Plurality and policy: aggregation versus deliberation 
If we take the view that research should have relevance (or going 
further, societal impact) it is not sufficient for researchers to report and 
describe plurality in public values without reference to possible policy 
recommendations or other societal purpose. The two main routes to 
resolving plurality for policy recommendations are aggregation and 
deliberation. Gutmann and Thompson (2004) summarise the strengths 
and limitations of aggregation and deliberation before drawing their 
conclusions in support of the latter. In the following subsections we 
draw on Gutmann and Thompson, noting examples of aggregative and 
deliberative approaches in studies of public values in health priority 
setting, with a view to outlining a single framework that combines the 
strengths of both. 
2.5. Aggregation 
Aggregative approaches tend to elicit, and sum, values from repre-
sentative, general public samples using methods that incorporate trade- 
offs; the limits of our willingness to make sacrifices in return for a good, 
or changed state of the world, represents the value we place on it. 
Stated preference methods such as willingness to pay (WTP), discrete 
choice experiments (DCE), or person trade off (PTO) are used in health 
and welfare economics to elicit preferences and values. Surveys of this 
kind do not challenge citizens’ preferences - aggregative approaches 
generally take public values as given and do not ask question about the 
(quality of) underlying reasons. This might be seen as a strength to some 
analysts who would like to see unfettered preferences, so far as it is 
possible, to avoid researchers leading or laundering values. Because the 
resolution of disagreement can be represented numerically, citizens can 
see how decisions are made. Such transparency is important for those 
with minority preferences whose values might not be respected by 
policies based on majority rules. 
Responses tend to be equally weighted in aggregation. Hence par-
ticipants’ voices are equally heard. Small, selective or biased samples, of 
the sort used in deliberative exercises, will lack legitimacy because they 
distort the distribution of population views and preferences the sample 
has been selected to represent. Large samples also generate diversity, 
and inclusion of diverse perspectives is likely to lead to better outcomes 
(Stevenson, 2016). 
But perhaps the most compelling argument for aggregative ap-
proaches is the ostensibly straightforward resolution of plurality: ag-
gregation produces determinate results, an answer emerges. More 
problematically, plurality is hidden behind averages and the normative 
basis of different types of aggregation is rarely discussed (Devlin et al., 
2017; Schneider, 2021). Although transparency is listed as a strength, as 
aggregative methods become more complex they also become more 
opaque to the non-specialist (few non-economists would claim detailed 
knowledge of the cost benefit analyses underpinning transport safety 
policy, for example). Aggregation pays no attention to the reasoning 
behind public values or the quality of arguments, nor to the fact that 
preferences might change after deliberation. The possibility of 
ill-informed or inconsistent preferences is not attended to, with all re-
sponses treated as equally valid. Furthermore, where one option wins 
out by only a small margin, aggregation is silent with respect to the 
justification or practical implications of a large minority being over-
ruled. Beyond observing and making visible the so-called heterogeneity 
in public values, it is not clear what the health economist would or could 
recommend other than the policy implied by aggregation of preferences. 
2.6. Deliberation 
Public deliberation takes different forms but can be summed up as 
talk-centred approaches with ‘ordinary people’ aimed at finding col-
lective solutions to social problems (Blacksher et al., 2012). The use of 
deliberation is growing (Abelson et al., 2013; Mitton et al., 2009), as 
exemplified in well-known health care institutions; for example, in the 
UK, NICE Citizens Council between 2002 and 2015; and in Canada the 
Citizens’ Reference Panel on Health Technologies [CRPHT] established 
in 2008 in Ontario. There is a range of approaches to public deliberation, 
collectively referred to as ‘mini-publics’, including citizens’ panels, cit-
izens’ juries, deliberative polls, planning cells, and forms of participa-
tory budgeting (Escobar and Elstub, 2017). In an often-cited essay, 
‘What is public deliberation?’ Blacksher et al. (2012) propose a mini-
mum definition with three key elements: 
“(1) the provision of balanced, factual information that improves 
participants’ knowledge of the issue; (2) () the inclusion of diverse 
perspectives to counter the well-documented tendency of better 
educated and wealthier citizens to participate disproportionately in 
deliberative opportunities and to identify points of view and con-
flicting interests that might otherwise go untapped; and (3) () the 
opportunity to reflect on and discuss freely a wide spectrum of 
viewpoints and to challenge and test competing moral claims.” p16 
On this definition, deliberation requires the location of common 
ground, not necessarily consensus or unanimity, but an agreed set of 
outputs that can be used for policy decisions (Blacksher et al., 2012). 
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The strengths of public deliberation are clear: it produces solutions 
and policy recommendations based on the reasoned exchange of views 
between citizens, after consideration of balanced information about a 
social problem. Resources are committed to provide time and conditions 
for a high-quality discussion, respectful questioning of views, listening 
and reason-giving, drawing on more abstract values and principles to 
justify positions. Participants should be open to the possibility of 
changing their minds in response to stronger arguments. By finding 
areas of common ground, proposals can be made that people with 
diverse views can live with. 
Public deliberation is also contentious and criticised because of the 
size and representativeness of groups selected for deliberation and the 
(likelihood of) representation of diverse viewpoints. Parkinson (2003) 
raises a number of legitimacy problems with deliberative democracy 
focusing on the issue of scale. For deliberation to satisfy the qualities 
that recommend it, i.e. listening, reason-giving, common ground and 
adjustment of positions on the basis of better reasons, it must take place 
in small groups. The greater the number of voices in a room, the less 
likely everyone will be heard and the exchange will be well reasoned. 
But the fact that deliberation must happen in small groups by necessity, 
raises questions of selection bias, diversity and representativeness – not 
everyone can take part (Parkinson, 2003). Although many mini-publics 
call for randomly sampled, non-partisan citizens for public deliberation, 
representation of diverse viewpoints in any one group is left to chance. 
More practically, and setting aside issues of scale, clear accounts of 
how deliberative groups reach consensus or agree collective recom-
mendations are lacking. In a review of public deliberation in health 
policy and bioethics, Abelson et al. (2013) found that, although pub-
lished studies adhere quite well to the minimum definition offered by 
Blacksher et al. (2012), there was ambiguity in relation to how repre-
sentation and diversity are achieved, and a lack of clarity around 
value-based reasoning and “what is required for value-based reasoning 
that produces collective judgments to occur” (Abelson et al., 2013) p12. 
For legitimate resolution of disagreement, transparency is important, 
particularly about how recommendations were agreed, how views 
shifted, and which reasons carried force. 
3. How to cope with plurality in public values for policy? 
The discussion of aggregation and deliberation thus far highlights 
that given the strengths and weaknesses of each, neither approach, used 
in isolation, is sufficient if we seek to respect plurality in policy rec-
ommendations. So, can they somehow be combined in a way that builds 
on respective strengths whilst overcoming their weaknesses? 
3.1. Disciplines, public values and plurality 
Academic disciplines place differential importance on counting, 
coherence and consensus when it comes to resolving plurality. Table 1 
sets out the ways in which economics, ethics and political science 
conceptualise and elicit public values (column 1); how plurality is 
addressed (column 2); and disciplinary emphasis on counting, coher-
ence and consensus in resolving plurality. This is illustrative and selec-
tive, other disciplines such as law or sociology could have been included 
but we have selected those that would most likely seek to make (sub-
stantive rather than procedural) recommendations about priority setting 
in health taking account of scarcity. It is also worth noting that these 
caricatures do not represent the diversity and nuance that exist nor 
highlight examples of interdisciplinary work (Gibson et al., 2016). 
Nonetheless our broad characterisations help illustrate some of the key 
issues and competing perspectives at play in resolving plurality. 
It seems clear that counting and measuring values is important. The 
extent and intensity of preferences in a population, as indicated by 
magnitude of trade-offs members of the public are willing to make to 
achieve policy goals, is important. However, by focusing only on what is 
common (as quantitative estimates often do), we are deaf to whether 
arguments are coherent. Commonly held values might be logically 
inconsistent, or call on irrelevant principles and arguments. If coherence 
is an important basis for policy, which seems reasonable, then incon-
sistent public values or values based on irrelevant arguments are 
Table 1 
Approach to public values and plurality by discipline – a simplification.  
Discipline How are public values and priority setting in 
health conceptualized/elicited? 
How is preference plurality in public values 
addressed? 
What emphasis is placed on i) counting ii) 
coherence (consistency) and iii) consensus? 
Health Economics 
(and more broadly 
welfare/public 
economics) 
Preferences are elicited using methods that 
present trade-offs (money/time/lives/health) to 
measure the value of health and health care and 
preferences over distribution of resources. 
Mixed methods work is still relatively uncommon 
in economics though interest is increasing. 
Choices are important and should be informed; 
higher-level reasons for choices might be seen as 
irrelevant by some economists. 
Individual preferences are aggregated to 
estimate social (public) value. 
Some analysts might look at distribution of 
preferences, otherwise means/medians are 
likely to hide disagreement and difference. 
Extreme values might be excluded from 
analysis (outliers that are seen to unduly 
affect the mean value). 
Counting is important through aggregation of large 
representative samples in stated preference studies 
Coherence is not considered. Consistency is 
considered in terms of irrational responses. 
Questions might be included to test rationality by 
repeating questions or presenting choices that are 
strictly dominated by alternatives. Inconsistent, 
responses might be excluded. 
Ethics 
(and more broadly 
branches of moral and 
political philosophy) 
Some ethicists would reject public values as 
irrelevant to good decisions. Public values can be 
reprehensible or ill-informed and normative 
claims cannot be based on public opinion. 
Approaches to procedural justice in health care 
priority setting have been influential (. In this 
context public values might be relevant in terms 
of the composition of a committee, acceptability 
of reasons (e.g. determining what is relevant), 
decisions and the right to appeal decisions. 
Ethical analysis would consider the range of 
relevant viewpoints or stakes in the issue in 
terms of the strength of claims, arguments 
and reasons. 
Studies of empirical ethics might include 
public views or values as relevant empirical 
data. 
Ethical analysis places emphasis on coherence of 
arguments, including logical consistency. 
Counting and consensus in public values might be 







Public values are expressed through electoral 
systems and citizens’ votes. 
Approaches to participatory, deliberative 
democracy, such as mini publics (such as citizens’ 
assemblies, juries) gather citizens together. There 
is emphasis on quality of communication, 
interaction and informed participation. 
Sometimes deliberative events include polls and 
counts. 
Typically the politician/party with the most 
votes gains majority and public values 
influence policies indirectly through 
constituency representation and/or 
lobbying. 
Mini publics tend to be randomly sampled in 
order to be representative. Plurality of views 
might occur by random chance; . 
Representative electoral systems rely on vote 
counting. Some mini publics will include polls or 
votes but usually only small numbers. 
Some administrative (cross party) committees in 
government will aim for consensus and coherent 
arguments should carry force. 
Mini publics sometimes, but not always, aim for 
consensus (or a super majority of 60–80% 
agreement on a decision). Emphasis is placed on 
finding common ground. Through reason giving 
more coherent arguments should prevail.  
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problematic. 
Yet coherence as the sole criterion to resolve plurality is also insuf-
ficient. If more than one coherent public view on a subject exists, how 
can a single policy recommendation be derived? 
Although deliberation is often concerned with seeking consensus 
about recommendations among people with different perspectives, 
consensus is also insufficient on its own, since we might find agreement 
on things that do not withstand critique in relation to their coherence. 
If counting, coherence and consensus are each insufficient, but 
simultaneously important, then the way forward in accounting for plu-
rality may be to explore the possibility of an integrated framework that 
allows examination of all ‘three Cs’ in empirical study and consequent 
policy recommendations. 
3.2. Counting, coherence and consensus in an interdisciplinary 
framework 
We propose an interdisciplinary, empirical framework, drawing on 
Sunstein’s Incompletely Theorized Agreements (ITA) (Sunstein, 1995, 
1998). It is offered as a means to combine the strengths of aggregative 
and deliberative approaches and to connect qualitative and quantitative 
methods, commonly used in each approach, in a unified empirical 
framework. In previous research, we identified and described public 
values in relation to provision of high-cost, life extending medicines for 
people with terminal illnesses (McHugh et al., 2015). We measured 
support for the three competing viewpoints we had identified and found, 
in brief, that:  
i) survey respondents were roughly evenly split across two dominant 
viewpoints, with a third view supported by roughly 10% and  
ii) the most common viewpoint did not consider the budget constraint, 
which we considered highly relevant (Mason et al., 2018). 
Thus, for researchers hoping to draw recommendations from our 
findings, majoritarianism did not present a clear answer and we 
concluded that there was a need to (not only report but also) critique 
public views in terms of their coherence and completeness. Reflecting on 
our own findings and on related papers (Shah et al., 2018), we were 
looking for a route forward for public values research to inform priority 
setting, when people disagree. It was in this context that wider reading 
led us to Incompletely Theorized Agreements and to consider the po-
tential merits of applying Sunstein’s ITA framework to empirical 
research. 
3.3. Incompletely Theorized Agreements 
Sunstein presents ITA as a means to resolve difficult decisions about 
which there is disagreement, arguing that agreements can be reached 
about particular cases without agreement on moral foundations. Writing 
in relation to law and sentencing (Sunstein, 1995) Sunstein wants ITA to 
be more generally relevant and offers it as a form of practical reasoning, 
of use to other decision making groups (Sunstein, 1998 p277). 
Through an ITA lens, resource allocation dilemmas can be examined 
at different levels of abstraction. At the highest level are fundamental 
principles, normative claims and grand theories that might be seen as 
the basis of decisions. At the most-specific (say, lowest) level are cases 
requiring decisions that will result in winners and losers. In-between, at 
a middle level, are operational rules or policy instruments that might be 
consistent with different principles (above) or different distributions of 
benefits in terms of cases (below). 
Fig. 1 presents the ITA framework in the context of priority setting in 
health (see also Ruger, 2012 who applies ITA to health and social jus-
tice). The levels are labelled principles, policies and patients. 
It is worth noting here that Sunstein does not strictly define the levels 
of the framework, only that they are low (more particular) or high (more 
abstract) relative to one another. This arguably leaves their definition 
flexible to the research question or policy dilemma under consideration. 
For example, in our application to health priority setting we label the 
highest level as principles but it could equally be defined in terms of 
foundational values if that was required. For the purposes of our 
example we see principles as normative claims that relate to how health 
resources should be allocated. At the mid-level are operational norms, 
tools or policies – these could be of the kind applied by HTA organisa-
tions (for example. cost-effectiveness thresholds applied in the UK or 
The Netherlands, or cancer drug funding policies, internationally (Guide 
to the method, 2013; Faden et al., 2009; NICE, 2009; Aggarwal et al., 
2014)). At the case level, are constrained choices, or judgements, be-
tween provision of resources to different groups of patients where 
budget constraints mean that not all can benefit. 
We present this multi-level framework as a means to untangle pri-
ority setting problems across levels of abstraction, from high-level 
principles through mid-level policies and operational norms to case- 
level judgements about provision to different groups of patients. This 
untangling permits analysis of consensus and coherence as well as more 
usual analysis of frequency (counting) and/or strength of preference. 
Consensus might be located at any of the three levels, even in the face of 
disagreement at other levels. Coherence can be examined looking 
vertically between expressed principles and choices over policies and 
patients. Public values are rarely explored in this way and researchers 
tend to give emphasis to one level or perhaps two (Arroyos-Calvera 
et al., 2019), often driven by disciplinary backgrounds and methodo-
logical preferences. Rarely do studies offer explicit separation of mul-
tiple levels in the same dataset. 
3.4. An applied example 
To illustrate, consider the recognised policy dilemma of provision of 
high cost, limited-effect medicines intended to extend life for people 
with for terminal illnesses, particularly advanced cancer . Many of these 
medicines, by usual standards, represent poor value for money and 
require special arguments for their provision, with patient groups and 
pharmaceutical companies campaigning strongly for their provision 
(Faden et al., 2009; Aggarwal et al., 2014; Chalkidou, 2012; Faden and 
Chalkidou, 2011; Sorenson, 2012). This led the English National Health 
Service to introduce special policies that make exceptions to standard 
threshold rules or separate funds for cancer drugs (Dillon and Landells, 
2018; McCabe et al., 2016; Littlejohns et al., 2016). 
Shah et al. (2018) carried out a systematic review of public prefer-
ence studies in this context of end-of-life medicines, finding 23 papers 
that use a range of WTP, PTO and DCE methods (Shah et al., 2018). Eight 
report a positive premium (the public is willing to pay more) for health 
gains that extend life at the end of life compared with other types of 
health gains, 11 studies find no premium, and four report mixed 
Fig. 1. Framework for empirical study of public values.  
R. Baker et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Social Science & Medicine 277 (2021) 113892
6
findings. Whilst these mixed findings are in part likely due to different 
research methods and the particular framing of questions, it is possible 
this also reflects substantial moral disagreement on the issue, a position 
supported by a Q methodology study which showed three different 
viewpoints (McHugh et al., 2015). The research reviewed by Shah et al. 
is important because it describes the nature of values and reveals value 
plurality, but it does not easily lead to policy recommendation. 
This policy dilemma is therefore one in which we have evidence of 
plurality in public values. Debates and empirical methods employed 
(separately) at each of these levels, hint at the quantitative and quali-
tative approaches that might be used to inform the framework, as now 
illustrated. 
3.5. Illustration 1 – choice based methods 
Public allegiances with high-level principles can be elicited using Q 
methodology, an established approach to explore subjectivity and 
identify shared accounts (Baker et al., 2006; Watts and Stenner, 2012; 
Brown, 1980; Stephenson, 1953). Respondents rank statements (e.g. 
describing principles or based on theories of distributive justice) ar-
ranging them onto a grid, according to the strength of their agreement or 
disagreement with them. Analysis identifies the shared perspectives that 
exist (based on correlations between participants’ rankings) and the 
strength of each participant’s association with each perspective. 
Let us suppose that analysis uncovers four distinct perspectives, 
illustrated in Figs. 2–4 in square boxes at the top of each figure, showing 
that there are groups of people who most closely align with, for illus-
tration, utilitarian (U), egalitarian (E), a hybrid sufficientarian/utili-
tarian (S/U) and worst-off (WO) perspectives. This is only for 
illustration, there is no requirement that respondents adhere to a single 
existing ethical framework and it is likely they will draw on principles 
from a range of ethical frameworks or theories. Then, asked to choose 
between various policies in relation to the same priority setting context 
(provision of expensive end-of-life medicines), the same respondents 
might choose policies which reflect their principles – for example, a 
broadly utilitarian policy (Pol U in Figs. 2–4) would make no special case 
for end-of-life medicines, emphasising the maximization of health 
benefit in relation to cost. Or they might choose policies that emphasise 
exceptions: an end-of-life policy that provides special means to provide 
high-cost medicines that extend life at the end-of-life, despite poor cost- 
effectiveness (Pol EoL); a cancer drugs policy would ring fence funds for 
cancer treatments (Pol CDF); and so on. Finally, participants would be 
presented with case-level choices between treating different groups of 
patients, described in terms of their illness, prognosis with and without 
treatment and, perhaps, other characteristics. Importantly, at the case 
level, opportunity costs are clear, treating patient group A means not 
treating patient group B or C. This framing is the basis of a number of 
preference elicitation methods used in health economics (for example 
DCE or PTO); questions are usually presented as a choice constrained by 
a limited budget. 
Using these (or similar) methods patterns in data across the multi- 
level framework could reveal points of consensus - where people with 
different principles nevertheless agree on a policy, for example, as 
illustrated in Fig. 2, or groups consistent across principles, policies and 
patients (vertical alignment) as shown in Fig. 3, or inconsistency as in 
Fig. 4. 
3.6. Illustration 2 – qualitative methods 
Alternatively, the empirical framework could be used to design 
deliberative events (such as citizens’ assemblies and other mini-publics) 
to make explicit the ways in which consensus was achieved, how views 
shifted, and which moral arguments carried greatest force. Without 
reiterating the key features of public deliberation (see previous sections 
and associated references) we argue that such an explicit framework 
would improve transparency and provide analysts with a structure to 
frame data collection before, during and after deliberation and to report 
more clearly the processes and outcomes of deliberation. Facilitation 
methods could be explicitly designed to surface values at all three levels; 
coding and analysis similarly structured by levels of specificity. (Some of 
this is likely already part of deliberative techniques but not always 
explicit.) Methods of reflexive balancing might then be brought to bear 
either individually or in group sessions. In brief, where stated principles 
are in tension with choices over policies or cases, guided discussion 
might lead to explanation and discussion of apparent inconsistencies 
leading to some revision of either principles or choices to achieve bal-
ance, or equilibrium (Ives, 2014). This would require expert facilitation. 
Some of the more quantitative tools from Illustration 1 would be a 
useful addition to discursive methods in small-scale deliberative events 
to make explicit participants’ commitments to principles for discussion 
and reflexive balancing, or to justify and provide evidence to support 
recommendations for policy. Q methodology has sometimes been used 
in deliberative events (Niemeyer et al., 2013) and choice-based trade-off 
exercises have been part of some public deliberation processes (Bentley 
Fig. 2. Incompletely theorized agreement on policy.  
Fig. 3. Consistency across levels of specificity.  
Fig. 4. Inconsistency across levels of specificity.  
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et al., 2018). Using the framework to shape the design and processes of 
deliberation, as well as the analysis and presentation of findings, allows 
the nature of consensus to be evidenced: how and where it was found, 
which reasons carried greatest force and in what ways minds were 
changed. 
Lastly, by collecting structured information about participants’ be-
liefs and principles before deliberation, researchers and facilitators can 
ensure a sample that includes diverse perspectives by selecting people 
known to think differently on an issue. This would replace random 
sampling, which leaves diversity to chance, or use of proxy selection 
variables such as socio-demographic information about participants, 
selecting characteristics which are assumed to link to diversity in values. 
Repeating the same (e.g. Q sort) exercise after deliberation will reveal 
whose views have shifted and how, or which values are stable or sticky. 
The result of deliberation structured using this framework would be 
clearer, tackling some of the issues of representation, diversity and 
clarity around value-based reasoning identified by (Abelson et al. in 
their review). 
4. Discussion 
Our central motivation in this paper has been to find ways to evi-
dence plurality in public values with respect to difficult choices in health 
priority setting. We have argued that usual approaches to plurality using 
aggregative or deliberative methods do not provide policy communities 
with the information they require to make policy grounded in public 
values, when values are plural. We propose an empirical framework that 
rests on the analysis of public values expressed at three levels of speci-
ficity, labelled here: principles, policies and patients. Populating the 
framework and combining strengths of aggregative and deliberative 
approaches, it is possible to make visible the nature of plurality in public 
values. Such transparency across the three levels of the framework 
provides insight into counting, coherence and consensus that we suggest 
is useful for policy development. If policy makers are to engage with 
public values then the nature of plurality is relevant to their de-
liberations and decisions. Thus our central thesis is that, even in the face 
of plurality, eliciting quantitative and qualitative data across levels of 
abstraction has the potential to provide information that will help to 
inform policy recommendations. This is not to suggest that one solution 
will magically emerge, but rather that choices between policies can be 
explicitly justified in relation to the properties of public values, on the 
basis of a much clearer understanding of (in)consistencies and areas of 
consensus. 
It has been argued that people are unlikely to agree on substantive 
values underpinning priority setting (Landwehr and Klinnert, 2014) and 
so attention has turned to procedural fairness (Daniels and Sabin, 2002). 
But the potential for agreement in more-specific policies or cases in the 
face of disagreement at the level of principles is a question that has not 
been explored in the empirical literature. Majoritarian solutions that 
emerge from counting support for different policy trade-offs should be 
unpacked; the most common answer might not be the most coherent 
when principles and policy choices are examined alongside preferences 
between patient groups. Consistency in public values, examining how 
values are patterned vertically between levels, might point to more 
coherent bases for policy but, perhaps more importantly, examining 
(apparent) inconsistencies is likely to yield valuable insights. Doing so 
together with individuals (drawing for example on reflexive balancing 
techniques (Ives, 2014) or reflective interviews (Farsides, 2004)) opens 
up discussion and allows for refinement of principles or judgments about 
policies or cases. Neither coherence nor consensus can be relied upon, 
alone, to provide ‘the answer’; but a combined, multi-method approach 
would contribute to understanding of why people disagree and policy 
might be developed that recognises plurality explicitly. 
There are some aspects of this proposal that warrant further dis-
cussion or require empirical testing. We address three critical points 
here: that data might show many different and complex patterns; that 
such studies are likely to be prohibitively time-consuming and expen-
sive; and that decision makers may show little appetite for such (com-
plex) data. 
4.1. Multiple patterns 
Consider Figs. 2–4, populated by real, noisy survey data. It is possible 
that multiple patterns are observed, simply revealing more and more 
granulated complexity of little use for drawing policy conclusions. This 
requires empirical research. Our expectation, based on previous work, is 
that there is a finite number of ways to look at an issue and a small 
number of competing perspectives will emerge. Those competing per-
spectives might be more or less supported by the population or might be 
more or less coherent (if we consider coherence as alignment between 
principles, policies and the implication of decisions for patient groups). 
Equally, patterns in data might reveal some points of consensus in spite 
of disagreement at other levels. Our framework does not provide guid-
ance about whether more coherence or more consensus is a better route 
to policy recommendations. Judgements will still be required that weigh 
alternatives, but they would be judgements made with the advantage of 
better information about public values (Baltussen et al., 2017), infor-
mation that addresses many of the issues with population averages or 
small group recommendations. Decision makers provided with an 
analysis of plurality in public values can explicitly take it into account in 
their deliberations. 
4.2. Resource intensive 
Multiple methods and layers of analyses are required with the same 
group of participants to examine patterns of responses between 
methods, whether qualitative or quantitative. If reflexive balancing 
methods are used, then people would be allowed to adjust their re-
sponses, perhaps returning to the exercises a number of times. Hence, 
respondent burden, compensation and researcher time need to be 
considered. Equally, however, multiple stated preference studies that do 
not resolve issues in a way that can be made useful for policy (such as the 
23 end-of-life studies reviewed by Shah et al. (2018)) are also expensive 
and time-consuming. Furthermore, some aspects of the approach 
described here, once developed, could be re-used. The high-level prin-
ciples would apply across many health priority setting questions and 
could be made available as a resource for future studies. Lastly, we do 
not propose this kind of study for all issues that require public 
involvement, but specifically for the so-called ‘wicked problems’ which 
are difficult to resolve and about which there is disagreement; end-of-life 
medicines being one such example. 
4.3. Decision makers do not demand this kind of data 
Policy interest in public values waxes and wanes. Although there has 
been a participatory turn in the health and social sciences and in health 
policy, and real appetite for effective public deliberation in priority 
setting in some countries, notably Canada (Mitton et al., 2011; Bentley 
et al., 2018), NICE in the UK, previously leading the way globally in 
terms of social values and HTA, seems to have weakened their 
commitment to engaging with social values, over the past few years 
(Littlejohns et al., 2019). An active Citizens Council that deliberated and 
made recommendations on questions of social values shows no evidence 
of having met since 2015 (NICE, 2020) and changes to NICE’s Social 
Values Judgement document limited their relevance and importance 
(Littlejohns et al., 2019; Shah, 2020). A recent consultation by NICE in 
December 2020, however, indicates that a new approach to public 
engagement and deliberation is under consideration, provisionally titled 
‘NICE Listens’. The proposal describes, 
“a new and flexible process for deliberative public engagement on 
moral, ethical and social value issues. This process will be used when 
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needed to ensure that NICE’s policies on complex and controversial 
issues reflect the values of informed members of the public.” p1 
(NICE, 2020) 
The final plans are not available at the time of writing but the pro-
posal points towards a more bespoke approach where methods of public 
engagement depend on the nature of the question. It also emphasises the 
need to be explicit of how public views and values have been taken into 
account: 
“The aim is to use modern, high-quality deliberative engagement to 
understand the views of the public, and to use this information 
alongside other forms of evidence to inform NICE’s policies. As a 
result, the policies will be defensible and more acceptable to the 
public. NICE is not mandated to follow the public’s advice. But we 
will plan in advance how the advice will be used, commit to 
considering it seriously and be explicit about how we have taken it 
into account.” p4 (NICE, 2020) 
A multi-level framework and methods such as we have set out here 
would provide some tools for NICE to be explicit about how public 
recommendations are taken into account. 
Decision makers’ demands notwithstanding, public values are 
important to health care resource allocation, for intrinsic and instru-
mental reasons. Furthermore, part of the point of this paper is that HTA 
committees, and others setting priorities in health and social care, find it 
challenging to make public values meaningful in their decision processes 
and have concerns about selection biases, representation and lack of 
diversity (Whitty, 2013). Informal discussions with one committee 
member suggested that it might be useful for committees to engage in 
the kinds of value elicitation exercises described here to establish their 
own predispositions and compare those with the values in the popula-
tion they serve. 
5. Conclusions 
The framework proposed in this paper provides a new way to 
examine plurality in public values with the aim of providing solutions to 
address the challenges it causes for priority setting and resource allo-
cation in health. This is a means to new knowledge and new insights and 
represents a different way of thinking about such issues. Further 
empirical work is required to address the challenges highlighted above 
so that the framework can be tested and refined to provide useful data 
for policy making. 
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